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Background: Patients with schizophrenia show overconﬁdence in memory and social cognition errors. The pres-
ent investigation examined whether this cognitive distortion also manifests in perceptual tasks.
Methods: A total of 55 individuals with schizophrenia, 58 with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) as well as
45 non-clinical controls were presented 24 blurry black and white pictures, half of which contained a hidden
object; the other half contained (“snowy”) visual noise. Participants had to judge whether the pictures depicted
an object or not and how conﬁdent they were in this judgment.
Results: Participants with schizophrenia showed overconﬁdence in errors and an enhanced knowledge corrup-
tion index (i.e. rate of high-conﬁdent errors on all high-conﬁdent responses) relative to both control groups. In
contrast, accuracy scores did not differ between clinical groups. Metacognitive parameters were correlated
with self-rated levels of current paranoia.
Discussion: To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to demonstrate overconﬁdence in errors among
individuals with psychosis using a visual perception task. Speaking to the speciﬁcity of this abnormality for
schizophrenia and its pathogenetic relevance, overconﬁdence in errors and knowledge corruptionwere elevated
in patients with schizophrenia relative to both control groups and were correlated with paranoia.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Delusional ideas are commonly deﬁned as false beliefs that are held
with conviction and are not amenable to change. Although there is no
symptompathognomonic for schizophrenia (Carpenter et al., 1973), ex-
treme paranoid beliefs such as feeling persecuted by the secret service
or the feeling that electrodes have been implanted into one's head by
a criminal organization are indicative of schizophrenia-spectrum disor-
ders. Importantly, some delusion-prone ideas, such as feelings of being
watched, are quite frequent in the general population (Ellett et al.,
2003; Lincoln, 2007; Moritz and Van Quaquebeke, 2014; Peters et al.,
1999; Verdoux and van Os, 2002). Freeman (2006) estimated that 1% to
3% of the nonclinical population have clinically relevant delusions; anoth-
er 5% to 6% display milder delusions, and 10% to 15% have fairly regular
subclinical delusional ideations (see also van Os et al., 2009, 2010).
Paranoid ideas usually do not come out of the blue as was presumed
decades ago, but evolve over time (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013; Klosterkötter,
1992) and are often closely linked to biographical and situationalHamburg-Eppendorf, Depart-
D-20246 Hamburg, Germany.
z).
nd share ﬁrst authorship.
c. This is an open access article unfactors. There is accumulating evidence that cognitive biases are in-
volved in the development of psychotic symptoms. Biases are deﬁned
as distortions in the processing, selection and appraisal of information
(Moritz et al., 2010b). Cognitive biases are not abnormal per se and do
not necessarily lead to problems. To illustrate, biases like a self-serving
attribution and unrealistic optimism are fairly normal and may even
promote well-being (Pohl, 2004). However, speciﬁc cognitive biases,
such as jumping to conclusions, may – in combination with other
factors – become toxic and result in severe psychopathological problems
(Moritz et al., 2010a). The focus of much research in schizophrenia has
been the jumping to conclusions bias (i.e., patients gather less informa-
tion for decision-making than controls; for a review see Fine et al., 2007;
Garety et al., 1991; Moritz and Woodward, 2005), the bias against
disconﬁrmatory evidence (i.e., counterevidence is not considered for
reasoning; Moritz and Woodward, 2006b; Woodward et al., 2006,
2007, 2008), as well as overconﬁdence in errors. The latter bias consti-
tutes the main focus of the present article.
Numerous studies have shown that patients with schizophrenia are
poor at calibrating their level of conﬁdence (Gaweda et al., 2012;Moritz
and Woodward, 2002; Moritz et al., 2003, 2008; Peters et al., 2007,
2013). Apart from questionnaires such as the Beck Cognitive Insight
Scale (BCIS; e.g. "My interpretations of my experiences are deﬁnitely
right."; Beck et al., 2004), which require a high level of introspection
(some patients may not be aware of their biases; Freeman et al., 2006;der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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mental cognitive tasks.When compared to healthy and psychiatric con-
trols, response conﬁdence is usually enhanced for erroneous judgments
in schizophrenia patients. In contrast, some studies demonstrate that
patients are less conﬁdent than controls when they are actually correct.
We have coined the term reduced conﬁdence gap for this response pat-
tern (i.e., enhanced conﬁdence in errors versus reduced conﬁdence in
correct responses). The majority of studies on overconﬁdence have
been conducted with memory tasks (Gaweda et al., 2012; Moritz and
Woodward, 2002; Moritz et al., 2003, 2008; Peters et al., 2007, 2013).
Recently, overconﬁdence in errors has been replicated with social cog-
nition tasks, whereby facial recognition items were complemented by
conﬁdence judgments (Kother et al., 2012; Moritz et al., 2012b).
Factors that modulate overconﬁdence in errors and/or under-
conﬁdence in correct responses are only partially understood. Using dif-
ﬁcult knowledge questions, we recently found underconﬁdence in
correct responses, but no difference in overconﬁdence in errors between
groups. We argue that awareness of one's deﬁcits may enhance reluc-
tance to make strong (high-conﬁdent) judgments. Moreover, the dopa-
mine system is likely involved. Antipsychotic medication attenuates
conﬁdence (Andreou et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2003), while dopamine
in turn enhances certainty (Lou et al., 2011). Importantly, overconﬁ-
dence in errors and other biases has been found to be present in neutral
(i.e. delusion-irrelevant) scenarios, precluding tautological inferences.
A reduced conﬁdence gap (e.g., Moritz et al., 2003) in combination
with an enhanced error rate may culminate in a state termed inﬂated
“knowledge corruption” (i.e., the proportion of high conﬁdence errors
on all high conﬁdent responses). In other words, a high proportion of
what the individual believes to be true is actually wrong. If individuals
cannot distinguish between correct and incorrect subjective facts, mo-
mentous mistakes may happen, which may foster paranoid ideation
(for a review see Moritz and Woodward, 2006c). In line with this, a re-
cent study found a linear relationship between the level of subjective
conviction for a (simulated) paranoid scenario, and emotional, as well
as behavioral consequences, for example, arming oneself and being pre-
pared to hurt someone when feeling threatened (Moritz and Van
Quaquebeke, 2014). In our view, errors are not necessarily momentous
if a false assumption is further tested and is not regarded as a deﬁnite
truth. However, caution is warranted as some studies have not found
cross-sectional associations between high conﬁdence errors and delu-
sional ideation (e.g., Moritz and Woodward, 2006c).
So far, most studies on overconﬁdence have employed memory
or social cognition tests. Replication is needed for perceptual tasks. A
multitude of investigations suggests that perceptual functions are com-
promised in the disorder (Chen, 2011; Silverstein and Keane, 2011; Tan
et al., 2013; van Assche and Giersch, 2011; Yoon et al., 2013), including
early visual processes (Knebel et al., 2011). One of the best replicated vi-
sual deﬁcits pertains to smooth pursuit movements as well as other eye
tracking dysfunctions (Levy et al., 2010; O'Driscoll and Callahan, 2008),
which recently has been linkedwith a failure to use efference copy infor-
mation (Spering et al., 2013). As Javitt (2009) points out, impairments
in basic perceptual processes may elicit higher order cognitive process-
ing deﬁcits. Hence, the study of visual, auditory and other perceptual
aspects may help to reveal more about the origins of cognitive deﬁcits
in schizophrenia.
As of yet, it has not been studied whether errors in perceptual tasks
are also accompanied by overconﬁdent appraisals. In a recent investiga-
tion on a nonclinical population (Moritz et al., 2014), we assessed
whether the liability to delusions would be associated with overconﬁ-
dence in errors in a perceptual task (embedded ﬁgures task) that did
not demand memory or social skills. Healthy individuals with high
scores on core paranoid symptoms were overconﬁdent in incorrect
responses and demonstrated a signiﬁcantly enhanced knowledge
corruption index relative to subjects with lower scores (20% vs. 12%).
For the present study, we hypothesized that schizophrenia patients
would display overconﬁdence in errors for perceptual judgments andwould show an enhanced knowledge corruption relative to both
healthy and psychiatric controls. We chose patients with obsessive–
compulsive disorder as the psychiatric control group because of inter-
esting similarities and differences to psychosis. While OCD has been
sometimes dubbed “disorder of doubt”, as patients constantly worry
about things they usually know are unfounded and absurd, paranoia
can be dubbed “disorder of conviction” as conﬁdence in delusional
beliefs is high per deﬁnitionem. At the same time, the demarcation is
sometimes blurry as many OCD patients perceive their obsessions as
partly perceptual (Moritz et al. 2014a) and a subgroup of OCD patients
shows poor illness insight,which has been added to theDSM-V, recently.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
The present studywas part of a larger trial investigating the effects of
mindfulness training on subjective well-being in patients with schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorders and obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD)
compared with healthy controls. Participants were allocated either to
mindfulness training (self-helpmanual attached as pdf ﬁle) or awaitlist
control group and were assessed before and six weeks after treatment.
We report cross-sectional data from the post assessment, which includ-
ed the visual perception task (not presented at baseline). The effect of
the intervention will be presented elsewhere. In short, mindfulness
did not have any impact on psychosis symptoms in any of the three
groups. Therefore, the treatment trial did not confound results for the
present project.
Different recruitment strategies were applied. A number of partici-
pants with schizophrenia and OCD were recruited using lists of previ-
ously discharged patients of the Departments of Psychiatry and
Psychotherapy of the University Clinic Hamburg-Eppendorf (UKE) and
the Central Institute of Mental Health Mannheim (CIMH). All partici-
pants had been previously treated in one of our institutions and had
provided written informed consent to be recontacted for future studies.
Other individuals had participated in previous online studies (some of
these trials requested a diagnostic telephone interview with the MINI di-
agnostic instrument (Sheehan et al., 1998) to conﬁrm the primary psychi-
atric diagnosis). Additional subjects were recruited with the help of the
German association forOCD(DGZ) and severalmoderatedGermanonline
discussion platforms providing people with OCD or psychosis with the
opportunity to exchange information. A study was posted on these plat-
forms (e.g., www.psychose.de) and a web-link provided access to the in-
ternet questionnaire. Participation was anonymous to foster unbiased
responses (this made it impossible to discern the proportion of patients
with previously veriﬁeddiagnoses). Nonclinical participantswere recruit-
ed from online panels and via word of mouth.
2.2. Security and inclusion criteria
The study was implemented with unipark®/questback®. Electronic
informed consent was obtained online from participants in accordance
with the department of data security in Hamburg and the local Ethics
committee. “Cookies” prevented multiple accesses from the same com-
puter. The following exclusion criteria were applied; 1. age below 18 or
above 65 years, 2. failure to complete the questionnaires 3. no diagnosis
of either schizophrenia or OCD (applies to the clinical groups only),
4. disclosure that the participant had not responded openly (ﬁnal ques-
tion), and 5. a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. We also excluded subjects
with stereotypical responses (same value entered on the psychometric
scales) and checked for deviant responses on the psychosis lie scale
(Moritz et al., 2013a). For OCD, a diagnosis of OCD on the web-based
screening questionnaire (WSQ; Donker et al., 2009) for commonmental
disorders was mandatory, whereas a prior episode of schizophrenia
or bipolar disorder led to exclusion. For healthy controls, suspected
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psychiatric treatment resulted in exclusion.
A total of 301 persons completed the visual perception task. A total
of 158 (i.e., healthy, n= 45; schizophrenia, n= 55; OCD, n= 58) par-
ticipants fulﬁlled the aforementioned criteria. The main reason for ex-
clusion was poor diagnostic ﬁt (n = 85; participants had psychiatric
disorders other than schizophrenia or OCD). Moreover, 36 participants
who considered themselves healthy either acknowledged a history of
psychological and psychiatric treatment and/or had social phobia, de-
pression and substance dependence according to the WSQ. Finally, in
order to match the groups for age and levels of education, some partic-
ipants (n = 22) were excluded blind to test results. All patients with
schizophrenia conﬁrmed that they received medication for their disor-
der. At the time of participation 73% of the schizophrenia participants
and 59% of theOCDparticipantswere in treatment,mainly in outpatient
facilities (schizophrenia: 47%; OCD: 34%).
2.3. Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences Scale (CAPE)
The Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences Scale (CAPE;
Stefanis et al., 2002) was administered in its authorized German trans-
lation. It consists of 42 items that are rated on a four-point Likert scale
(“Never”, “Sometimes”, “Often” and “Nearly always”) and tap into the
psychosis phenotype. The CAPE has three subscales measuring positive
(“Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TVwere written espe-
cially for you?”), negative (“Do you ever feel that you experience few or
no emotions at important events?”) and depressive (“Do you ever feel
pessimistic about everything?”) symptoms. Good reliability and
(factorial) validity of the scale have been reported (Fonseca-Pedrero
et al., 2012; Konings et al., 2006).We added four lie scale items (cut-off:
8 points) capturing commonmisconceptions about psychosis: a. seeing
tiny objects like white mice (indicative of delirium rather than psycho-
sis); b. alien abduction (a rare but highly publicized (face-valid) cliché
symptom), c. being a famous historical personality (a rare but highly
publicized (face-valid) cliché symptom), d. mental lapses during
which one becomes another person (i.e., split personality; a rare/
implausible but highly publicized cliché symptom).
Moreover, the 18-item frequency scale of the Paranoia Checklist
(Freeman et al., 2005b) was administered. Previous studies have con-
ﬁrmed good psychometric properties for the scale (Freeman et al.,
2005; Lincoln et al., 2010a, 2010b; Peters et al., 1999). According to fac-
tor analysis (Moritz et al., 2012a), the scale is best represented by two
dimensions called suspiciousness (“Bad things are being said about
me behind my back”) and core paranoia (“I can detect coded messages
aboutme in the press/TV/radio”). The online version has been tested be-
fore and contains a high internal consistency and test–retest reliability
(Moritz et al., 2014b).
Intermixed with items from the Paranoia Checklist, the 20-item
Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D; Hautzinger
and Brähler, 1993; Radloff, 1977) was applied along with 10 core
items from the 18-item Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-R (OCI-R;Fig. 1. Examples: the left panel depicts a hidden sailboat; the obFoa et al., 2002). The latter scale was used to make the rationale of the
study (i.e., investigation of cognitive correlates of paranoid ideation)
less transparent to participants in order to prevent response biases.
2.4. Visual pattern perception (Snowy Pictures Task)
The Snowy Pictures Task was adopted from a study byWhitson and
Galinsky (2008). Participants were presented 24 granulated black and
white pictures (see Fig. 1). For half of the pictures, the original image
had been removed digitally. All pictures were shown with comparable
brightness and contrast. No time constraint was set. Pictures with or
without objects were presented in pseudorandom order. For each
item, participants had to endorse on a four-point Likert scale whether
an object was present or not, graded for conﬁdence (i.e., "yes–very
sure"; “yes–unsure”; “no–unsure"; “no–very sure”). We used a 4-point
scale as scales with broader ranges are prone to response tendencies
(i.e., endorsing extreme values).
3. Results
Groups did not differ in age or gender (Table 1). Although healthy
subjects showed a tendency towards higher education, group differences
were insigniﬁcant on this variable. Schizophrenia patientsmade less hits
(i.e., correct identiﬁcation of an object, irrespective of conﬁdence) and
less overall correct responses (i.e., hits and correct rejections) relative
to healthy controls but not compared with psychiatric controls (see
Table 2). No group differences emerged for false alarms (i.e., object mis-
takenly perceived as present). Regarding metacognitive parameters, a
number of schizophrenia-speciﬁc impairments were seen. Compared
with OCD patients and healthy controls, individuals with psychosis
showed a greater amount of high-conﬁdent errors on all errors, a greater
frequency of high-conﬁdent incorrect responses and accordingly a
higher knowledge corruption index (% of all high-conﬁdent errors on
all high-conﬁdent responses; see Table 2). Relative to healthy controls
but not schizophrenia participants, OCD participants showed a lower
number of high-conﬁdent correct responses as well as a lower percent-
age of high-conﬁdent correct responses on all correct responses.
3.1. Correlation analyses
When looking at associations between metacognitive parameters
and paranoia in the entire sample, the Paranoia Checklist was signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with knowledge corruption (r = .17, p = .028) and
the number of high-conﬁdent errors (r= .18, p= .021), while it was in-
versely correlated with the number of high-conﬁdent correct responses
(r=− .28, p b .001). The core paranoia subscale score of the Paranoia
Checklist was signiﬁcantly correlated with knowledge corruption
(r= .24, p= .003) and the number of high-conﬁdent errors (r= .26,
p= .001). Again, it was inversely correlated with the number of high-
conﬁdent correct responses (r = − .20, p = .01). In the OCD group,ject has been removed from the picture in the right panel.
Table 1
Group differences on background and psychopathological characteristics.
Healthy (n = 45) Schizophrenia (n = 55) OCD (n = 58) Statistics (Bonferroni-corrected)
Sociodemographic characteristics
Gender (% male) 31% 40% 38% χ2(1) = 0.90, p N .6
Mean age (years) 37.24 (13.93) 38.22 (8.61) 40.26 (10.66) F(2,155) = 1.01, p N .3
Formal school education (% 13th grade;
qualiﬁcation to enter university in Germany)
86% 69% 67% χ2(1) = 5.21, p = .07
CAPE
Positive 1.23 (0.17) 1.80 (0.39) 1.40 (0.30) F(2,155) = 33.76, p b .001; S N O N H
Negative 1.63 (0.35) 2.32 (0.54) 2.22 (0.54) F(2,155) = 20.25, p b .001; S, O N H
Depressed 1.65 (0.36) 2.31 (0.45) 2.38 (0.43) F(2,155) = 30.47, p b .001; O, S N H
OCI-R total (abbreviated) 3.96 (4.55) 6.29 (8.24) 8.22 (6.72) F(2,155) = 44.18, p b .001; O N S N H
N = difference signiﬁcant at p b .05.
168 S. Moritz et al. / Schizophrenia Research: Cognition 1 (2014) 165–170none of these parameters was correlated with the OCI-R total score
(abbreviated version). Again, the Paranoia Checklist was negatively
correlated with the number of all high-conﬁdent correct responses
(r =− .36, p = .005) and the number of high-conﬁdent incorrect re-
sponses (r=− .27, p=.038) in this group. In the schizophrenia sample,
the Paranoia Checklist correlated with the knowledge corruption index
at trend level (r= .23, p= .098) and signiﬁcantly with the number of
high-conﬁdent incorrect responses (r= .29, p= .029). The core para-
noia subscale correlated with both the knowledge corruption index
(r = .32, p= .018) and with the number high-conﬁdent incorrect re-
sponses (r= .34, p= .01).
3.2. Psychometric properties
Test–retest reliability was excellent for all scales (Paranoia checklist
total score: r=.85; CES-D depression scale: r=.84, OCI-R (abbreviated):
r= .88; all p b .001).
4. Discussion
Overconﬁdence in errors is a hallmark symptom of delusions. A
growing number of ﬁndings suggest that this bias also manifests in
non-delusional scenarios. The present study elucidated overconﬁdence
in errors in a visual perception task in schizophrenia participants
conﬁrming our primary hypothesis: Overconﬁdence in errors and
knowledge corruption in schizophrenia are not conﬁned to memory
(Gaweda et al., 2012; Moritz and Woodward, 2002; Moritz et al.,
2003, 2008; Peters et al., 2007) and social cognitive tasks (Kother
et al., 2012; Moritz et al., 2012b), but extend to perception. Schizophre-
nia patients were overconﬁdent about false perceptual judgments,
while showing less certainty for correct judgments. These results cor-
roborate earlier ﬁndings obtained in a nonclinical sample divided for
paranoia scores using the same task (Moritz et al., 2014). Interestingly,
between-group differences were found compared not only to healthyTable 2
Group differences on accuracy and metacognitive parameters.
Healthy (n = 45) Schiz
Accuracy
Hits 8.82 (1.80) 7.58
All correct (i.e., hits and correct rejections) 19.16 (2.33) 17.55
False alarms 1.67 (2.60) 2.04
Metacognition (conﬁdence)
High conﬁdent incorrect 1.02 (1.20) 2.49
High conﬁdent correct 13.07 (4.16) 10.64
Percentage high conﬁdent correct/all correct 68.05 (19.32) 60.89
Percentage high conﬁdent incorrect/all incorrect 21.31 (25.44) 37.30
Knowledge corruption⁎ 6.53 (7.20) 17.24
N = difference signiﬁcant at p b .05.
⁎ if no high-conﬁdent responses were made, the Knowledge Corruption Index (KCI) was setcontrols but also to OCD patients, supporting the hypothesis of speciﬁc
dysfunctions of metacognition in schizophrenia. In contrast, while pa-
tients with schizophrenia performed worse than nonclinical controls
in terms of accuracy, in linewith other studies on the embedded ﬁgures
tasks (Malaspina et al., 2004), scores did not differ between clinical
groups (Moritz and Woodward, 2006a).
Metacognitive dysfunctions, particularly overconﬁdence in errors,
have been linked to liberal acceptance (i.e., a lowered threshold for
accepting hypotheses as true), which has also been implicated in
jumping to conclusions (Moritz et al., 2007, 2008). If hypotheses are pre-
maturely accepted as true, the individual is less likely to look for further
proof and may thus ignore or miss contradictory information. Conﬁ-
dence for these false responses is probably enhanced relative to partici-
pants who arrive at false conclusions based on a more thorough
examination as more careful consideration will lead to a more ambigu-
ous appraisal. Liberal acceptance (for an early account see Miller,
1976) may also explain underconﬁdence for correct judgments, which
was also found within the schizophrenia sample in the present study
(relative to healthy but not OCD controls): a premature termination of
search processes limits chances of ﬁnding additional valid information,
which could have further raised conﬁdence.
This study has several limitations, including the mode of recruit-
ment. Diagnoses of most participants relied on self-report, while only
a subsample of subjects had veriﬁed diagnoses from previous hospital-
izations. Also, some symptoms such as ﬂat affect and disorganization
of thought, which have been related to visual perception impairments
before, are difﬁcult to detect through self-report. However, good inter-
nal consistencies as well as plausible mean scores (mean scores in the
CAPE are comparable to clinical patients with veriﬁed diagnoses;Moritz
et al., 2013b) suggest high quality of the obtained data. Moreover,
previous studies suggest that online studies are harder to sabotage
than often presumed (Moritz et al., 2013b). Further, because of the rath-
er large sample size, the ﬁndings are quite robust. Finally, we used a
psychosis lie detection scale to prevent false-positive diagnoses ofophrenia (n = 55) OCD (n = 58) Statistics (Bonferroni-corrected)
(2.35) 8.47 (2.34) F(2,155) = 4.31, p = .015; H N S
(2.51) 18.31 (2.24) F(2,155) = 5.76, p = .004; H N S
(2.80) 2.16 (2.46) F(2,155) = 0.46, p N .6
(2.61) 1.50 (1.96) F(2,155) = 6.85, p = .001; S N O, H
(5.06) 9.69 (4.40) F(2,155) = 7.13, p = .001; H N S, O
(28.03) 53.39 (24.36) F(2,155) = 4.59, p = .012; H N O
(33.11) 23.27 (29.06) F(2,155) = 4.60, p = .012; S N O, H
(15.59) 10.35 (12.93) F(2,155) = 9.31, p b .001; S N O, H
at 0%.
169S. Moritz et al. / Schizophrenia Research: Cognition 1 (2014) 165–170schizophrenia. Another limitation relates to the fact that the study only
explored visual perception. Perceptual deﬁcits have been identiﬁed for
other sensory channels as well, including auditory (Nguyen et al.,
2010) and olfactory perception (Nguyen et al., 2010) so that our ap-
proach needs to be tested for these modalities.
There are a number of questions that need to be addressed in further
studies: First, we need to ﬁnd out more about speciﬁc conditions that
foster or attenuate overconﬁdence in errors such as task difﬁculty,
"lure" strengths in studies using the false memory paradigms (Lee
et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2008), and the role of dopaminergic processes
(Andreou et al., 2014). Second, it must be clariﬁed how the response
mode (sometimes conﬁdence is measured with binary scales, some-
times with scales using a greater range of options) impacts results.
Since overconﬁdence in errors is partly related to acute symptoms as a
statemarker, we assume that performancemay vary over time, depend-
ing on the severity of illness. In order to address these questions, longi-
tudinal designs, preferably with multiple, short-interval assessment
points should be applied. This would allow to analyze whether ﬂuctua-
tions in conﬁdence levels are a predictor of later-onset paranoid symp-
toms. Moreover, it could substantiate our ﬁnding that problems
with calibrating conﬁdence in distinguishing correct from incorrect re-
sponses represent a risk factor for the emergence of paranoia and subse-
quent emotional and behavioral problems (Moritz andVanQuaquebeke,
2014). Interventions that highlight the fallibility of human judgment per
se and the consequences of highly conﬁdent but erroneous judgments,
such as Metacognitive Training (Moritz et al., 2010b, 2013c), Social
Cognition and Interaction Training (Roberts and Penn, 2009) or the
Maudsley Reasoning Program (Waller et al., 2011),may reduceparanoid
ideas. These programs teach how an escalation of cognitive biases can
create problems and even foster psychotic symptoms. Patients are
encouraged to be more cautious in their decision-making processes
and to search for further conﬁrmatory or disconﬁrmatory evidence if
information is equivocal (“better safe than sorry").
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that schizophrenia patients
show a reduced conﬁdence gap and enhanced knowledge corruption
relative to both healthy and OCD controls.
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